

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01     PRETOR 06534 01 OF 03 012153Z

ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 SP-02 SS-15 EB-08 H-01  
INRE-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 SSO-00 INR-07 ARA-10 /079 W  
-----024066 012303Z /75

O 012100Z DEC 77

FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9747

INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 PRETORIA 6534

FROM MC HENRY AND PETTERSON

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR AO US

SUBJ: ANGOLA: DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER JORGE

REF: (A) LUSAKA 3620, (B) STATE 275569

1. SUMMARY: IN A LENGTHY CONVERSATION WITH US FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH THE CONTACT GROUP, ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER PAULO JORGE STRESSED THAT ANGOLA WAS TRULY NON-ALIGNED AND WANTED TO HAVE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. ANGOLA WAS JEALOUS OF ITS INDEPENDENCE AND RESENTED THE ATTEMPTS OF ANYONE, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, TO EXERCISE UNDUE INFLUENCE OVER ITS AFFAIRS. HE ATTRIBUTED THE US FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE ANGOLA TO THE FACT THAT ANGOLA WAS MOVING TOWARD SOCIALISM, AND ACCUSED THE USG OF CONTINUING TO SUPPORT UNITA, FNLA AND FLEC. ON NAMIBIA, HE SAID THE CONTACT GROUP HAD PRESENTED NEW IDEAS AND PROPOSALS WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CAREFULLY STUDY. END SUMMARY

2. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE CONTACT GROUP AND ANGOLAN OFFICIALS (REFTEL A), AMBASSADOR  
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PAGE 02     PRETOR 06534 01 OF 03 012153Z

MCHENRY SUGGESTED TO FONMIN JORGE THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MCHENRY'S VISIT TO DISCUSS BILATERAL MATTERS. SINCE WE WERE DEPARTING EARLY NEXT MORNING, JORGE SUGGESTED AN IMMEDIATE MEETING ALTHOUGH HE WAS DUE AT ANOTHER IN A DAILY SERIES OF PREPARATORY MEETINGS FOR THE PARTY CONGRESS. THE CONVERSATION, WHICH -- DESPITE SOME DIFFERENCES OF OPINION -- WAS FRIENDLY

THROUGHOUT, LASTED ONE AND A HALF HOURS. JORGE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY BERNARDINO SIGUEROS, HEAD OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

2. MCHENRY BEGAN BY AGAIN THANKING THE ANGOLANS FOR THE WARM RECEPTION GIVEN THE CONTACT GROUP AND THEN MADE THE POINTS PROVIDED REFTEL (B). HE ADDED THAT DESPITE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT COMMUNICATION BE MAINTAINED AND THAT WE EACH MAKE A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO AT LEAST UNDERSTAND THE OTHER'S POINT OF VIEW. (DURING THE CONVERSATION, WE RESPONDED TO JORGE'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS WHEN HE MADE THEM. HOWEVER, FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY, IN THIS REPORT WE FIRST PRESENT THE MAJOR POINTS HE MADE , THEN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OUR RESPONSE.)

3. JORGE SAID HE ALSO WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A FRANK DISCUSSION AND AGREED THAT COMMUNICATION WAS ESSENTIAL. HE WAS ESPECIALLY DISTURBED THAT MUCH OF THE REPORTING IN FOREIGN MEDIAL REGARDING ANGOLA WAS DISTORTED AND THAT AS A RESULT THE USG HAD AN INCORRECT IMPRESSION OF THE SITUATION IN HIS COUNTRY. FOR EXAMPLE, RECENTLY HE HAD LISTENED TO THE PROMINENCE GIVEN BY VOA TO INACCURATE CLAIMS BY GEORGE SANGUMBA (UNITA) THAT UNITA CONTROLLED TEN ANGOLAN PROVINCES. ANGOLA DID NOT HIDE

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PAGE 03     PRETOR 06534 01 OF 03 012153Z

THE FACT THAT IT HAD NUMEROUS PROBLEMS INCLUDING DISSIDENT ELEMENTS, BUT IT WISHED ACCURATE REPORTING OF THOSE PROBLEMS. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT A UNITA OFFICE WAS ABOUT TO BE OPENED IN NEW YORK AND SAID THAT THIS WOULD ADD TO THE MISINFORMATION. WHY WOULD THE US ALLOW SUCH ACTIVITIES?

4. JORGE SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE US WITHHELD RECOGNITION AND HAD NOT EVEN AVAILED ITSELF OF OPPORTUNITIES TO TALK. WAS IT, HE ASKED, BECAUSE ANGOLA WAS SOCIALIST? (HE RETURNED TO THIS THEME SEVERAL TIMES, CONVEYING IN AN UNDERSTATED YET QUITE CLEAR WAY THAT HE BELIEVED THE US WAS ANTAGONISTIC TOWARD ANGOLA BECAUSE THE LATTER WAS FOLLOWING A COURSE TOWARD SOCIALISM.) HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT ANGOLA WAS NOT SOCIALIST YET. (THEY "YET" WAS PREGNANT IN TONE AND ITS IMPLICATION MAY BE SEEN IN THE SIGNS PLASTERED ON WALLS IN LUANDA: "WE ARE INDEPENDENT; WE WILL BE SOCIALIST." IT COULD BE THAT BECOMING A SOCIALIST STATE, WHATEVER THAT MEANS, WILL BE ONE OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE PARTY CONGRESS.)

5. WHY, SAID JORGE, DID THE US HARP ON THE CUBA

QUESTION? DID NOT ANGOLA, AS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY, HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF AND SEEK ASSISTANCE WHEREVER IT WISHED? AND "ON WHAT MORAL BASIS" DID THE US OBJECT TO THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS WHEN THE US HAD ITS MILITARY FORCES STATIONED AROUND THE WORLD, EVEN IN CUBA? THE US DECISION TO MAKE THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES A PRE-CONDITION TO RECOGNITION WAS "CLEAR INTERFERENCE" IN ANGOLA'S AFFAIRS.

DISSIMINATION COORDINATED WITH SS/O PER MR.SUMMERS.

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PAGE 01     PRETOR 06534 02 OF 03 012213Z  
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 SP-02 SS-15 EB-08 H-01  
INRE-00 NSCE-00 INR-07 CIAE-00 SSO-00 ARA-10 /079 W  
-----024261 012304Z /75

O 012100Z DEC 77

FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

TO SECSTATE WASHED IMMEDIATE 9748

INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 PRETORIA 6534

FROM MC HENRY AND PETTERSON

6. JORGE NOTED THAT NO ONE IN THE WEST HAD OBJECTED WHEN SOUTH AFRICA HAD INVADDED ANGOLA. FURTHERMORE, TODAY ZAIRE AND FRANCE WERE SUPPORTING FNLA, FLEC, AND UNITA.

7. THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF ANGOLA'S FOREIGN POLICY WAS TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES. ANGOLA WAS GENUINELY NON-ALIGNED. IT DEFINITELY WANTED NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE US BUT WAS UNWILLING TO SACRIFICE PRINCIPLE AND ALLOW OTHERS TO INFLUENCE ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IN THIS CONNECTIN, HE WISHED THE US TO WATCH, BECAUSE IN NEAR FUTURE ANGOLA MIGHT FIND IT NECESSARY, HOWEVER PAINFUL, TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INDEPENDENCE EVEN TO ITS FRIENDS. THERE WERE THOSE WHO HAD ASSISTED THE MPLA IN THE PAST AND THEN TRIED TO DOMINATE IT. THEY COULD NOT DOMINATE THE MPLA WHEN IT WAS DEPENDENT; THEY WOULD NOT DOMINATE AN INDEPENDENT ANGOLA. SPECIFICALLY, ANGOLA ACCEPTED

COMMUNIST SUPPORT, BUT THEY COULD NOT BE "ALIGNED"  
WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

8. JORGE STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT THE US WAS WAITING  
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PAGE 02     PRETOR 06534 02 OF 03 012213Z

EITHER FOR THE MPLA TO SUBDUE ITS OPPOSITION OR FOR THE  
DISSIDENTS TO TRIUMPH. HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY RELIABLE  
SOURCES, WHICH DID NOT IDENTIFY, THAT THE US  
CONTINUED TO SUPPORT FLEC, UNITA AND FNLA. MOREOVER,  
THE ANGOLAN GOVT KNEW THAT A MAJOR ATTACK WAS PLANNED  
AND WHO WAS PLANNING IT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ANGOLA  
FACED SERIOUS INTERNAL PROBLEMS WITH DISSIDENTS BUT MAINTAINED  
THEY WERE NOT AS SERIOUS AS PICTURED. ANGOLA WANTED TO  
END THESE DIFFICULTIES AND TURN ITS ATTENTION TO THE  
SERIOUS DEVELOPMENTAL PROBLEMS IT NOW FACED.

9. TURNING TO THE NAMBIAN ISSUE, JORGE SAID THAT ANGOLA  
VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THE MEETING JUST CONCLUDED WITH  
THE CONTACT GROUP. HE THOUGHT THE DISCUSSION REVEALED  
NEW IDEAS AND PROPOSALS OF WHICH HE WAS PREVIOUSLY  
UNAWARE. HIS GOVT WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO STUDY  
VERY CAREFULLY THE POINTS COVERED IN THE DISCUSSION.  
ANGOLA WISHED TO SEE THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION RESOLVED  
AND THEREBY BE RELIEVED OF THE BURDEN OF SUPPORTING  
SWAPO AND OPPOSING SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR UNITA.  
IN ADDITION, THE FEAR OF ANOTHER SOUTH AFRICAN  
INVASION OF ANGOLA WOULD BE ENDED.

10. FINALLY, JORGE NOTED THAT HE HAD AUTHORIZED THE  
ANGOLAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN TO DISCUSS  
NORMALIZATION WITH THE US WHY HAD THE  
US BROKEN OFF  
THESE DISCUSSIONS?

11. IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, MCHENRY FOLLOWED  
THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFTEL (B). IN ADDITION, WE  
RESPONDED TO JORGE'S REMARKS AND QUESTIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03     PRETOR 06534 02 OF 03 012213Z

12. WE SAID THAT WE WERE UNAWARE OF ANY MOVE TO ESTABLISH  
A UNITA OFFICE IN THE US BUT HOPED HE UNDERSTOOD THE  
NATURE OF US SOCIETY. IF ANY ORGANIZATION REGISTERED AS  
A FOREIGN AGENT, THE USG COULD NOT, UNDER LAW, RESTRICT  
ITS FREE SPEECH. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE IF, AS

JORGE STATED, AN OFFICE WAS TO BE HEADED BY US CITIZEN.  
WE WOULD STATE THAT UNITA OFFICE IN NEW YORK WOULD IN  
NO WAY REPRESENT USG SUPPORT, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD NOT BE  
SURPRISED, GIVEN THE PAST, IF ANGOLANS WERE SKEPTICAL.

13. WE DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY CURRENT BASIS FOR THE  
ALLEGATION THAT THE US SUPPORTED UNITA, FLEC OR FNLA.  
THE UGS WAS FIRMLY OF THE VIEW THAT ANGOLANS SHOULD BE  
FREE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS WITHOUT INTERFERENCE  
FROM OUTSIDERS. SIMILARLY, IT WAS UP TO ANGOLANS  
TO DECIDE ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL  
BASIS OF THEIR GOVT. WE AS A PEOPLE HAD OUR  
PREFERENCE AND ON OCCASION MAY HAVE BEEN TOO JEALOUS  
IN EXPRESSING THAT PREFERENCE TO OTHERS. HOWEVER,  
WE KNEW THAT THERE WAS DIVERSITY AMONG NATIONS AND THAT  
ALL NATIONS WOULD HAVE TO LIVE WITH THAT FACT. AGAIN,  
WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED BY ANGOLAN SKEPTICISM. THE  
PAST WAS ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO LIVE DOWN, AND WE WERE  
AWARE THAT US POLICY WOULD BE JUDGED BY CURRENT ACTIONS  
RATHER THAN PROTESTATIONS.

14. WE AGREED THAT THERE WAS NEED FOR BETTER  
COMMUNICATION AND THAT THERE MIGHT BE INSUFFICIENT  
KNOWLEDGE IN THE US ABOUT THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA.  
HOWEVER, ANGOLA, BY PERMITTING MORE ACCESS BY JOURNALISTS,  
COULD DO ITS PART TO HELP ENSURE THAT THE WORLD WAS  
MORE ACCURATELY INFORMED. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE NOTED  
THE POSITIVE PICTURE OF MOZAMBIQUE WHICH HAD EMERGED  
FROM A RECENT SERIES OF ARTICLES BY MICHAEL KAUFMAN OF  
THE NEW YORK TIMES. ON THE OTHER HAND, NO INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04     PRETOR 06534 02 OF 03 012213Z

DISSIMINATION COORDINATED WITH SS/O PER MR. SUMMERS.

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PAGE 01     PRETOR 06534 03 OF 03 012224Z

ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 SP-02 SS-15 EB-08 H-01  
INRE-00 NSCE-00 INR-07 CIAE-00 SSO-00 ARA-10 /079 W

-----024355 012302Z /75

O 012100Z DEC 77

FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9749

INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 PRETORIA 6534

FROM MC HENR AND PETTERSON

WAS AVAILABLE TO REFUTE THE SERIES OF ARTICLES BY LEON DASH IN THE WASHINGTON POST DEPICTING BROAD SUPPORT FOR UNITA.

15. ON THE QUESTION OF CUBAN TROOPS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO US RECOGNITION, MCHENRY STATED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE ANGOLAN SITUATION PRESENTED FACTORS THAT STRUCK SENSITIVE CHORDS AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. FIRST, CUBA WAS AN ISSUE IN AMERICAN POLITICS. CUBA HAD VIOLATED MANY OF THE PRINCIPLES FOR WHICH WE STOOD, HAD ATTEMPTED TO OVERTHROW GOVTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND HAD PLACED A THREAT ON OUR OWN DOORSTEP. WE KNEW THE CUBANS WERE SURROGATES OF THE SOVIETS.

16. SECOND, THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF IDEOLOGY. WE MUST CANDIDLY RECOGNIZE THE AMERICANS ARE SUSPICIOUS OF COUNTRIES WHICH APPEAR TO BE IN THE COMMUNIST CAMP, DESPITE THEIR AVOWAL OF NON-ALIGNMENT. THE CUBAN PRESENCE AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA MADE THE SITUATION MORE DIFFICULT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02      PRETOR 06534 03 OF 03 012224Z

17. FINALLY, THERE WAS A GENUINE DOUBT ON THE PART OF MANY AMERICANS THAT THE MPLA GOVT EXERCISED EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER ANGOLA. MANY HOLD THAT THE MPLA ATTAINED AND MAINTAINED POWER THROUGH THE USE OF FOREIGN TROOPS. THUS, THERE WAS DOUBT THAT THE MPLA GOVT MET ACCEPTED CRITERIA FOR RECOGNITION. PRESS REPORTS, SUCH AS THOSE WRITTEN BY SASH, IMPLIED THAT WERE IT NOT FOR THE CUBANS, AN ACCOMMODATION WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED BETWEEN MPLA AND THOSE GROUPS THAT ACTIVELY OPPOSED IT IN ANGOLA.

18. ON THE QUESTION OF CONTACTS IN NEW YORK, MCHENRY EMPHASIZED THAT THESE WERE NOT BROKEN OFF. HOWEVER, WE HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES,

SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD ONLY FIND US REPEATING THAT  
CONDITIONS DID NOT YET EXIST FOR NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS.  
NONETHELESS, US REPS AT THE UN, PARTICULARLY  
AMB YOUNG, HAD TRIED TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE  
ANGOLAN PERMANENT REP. WE KNEW, FOR EXAMPLE,  
THA THE ANGOLANS WERE MOST INTERESTED IN NAMIBIA AND  
THEREFORE HAD TRIED TO KEEP THEM INFORMED. SIMILARLY,  
WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE LAW, THE US HAD TRIED TO BE  
HELPFUL WITH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA.

19. COMMENT: JORGE CLEARLY WANTED ONCE AGAIN TO GET  
THE MESSAGE TO THE US GOVT THAT ANGOLA IS  
NOT TIED TO THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH US--THE SOONER THE  
BETTER. NEVERTHELESS, AS A SOVEREIGN STATE, ANGOLA CANNOT  
AGREE TO MODIFY ITS MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA AS  
A PRICE TO PAY FOR US RECOGNITION. CUBAN TROOPS WILL  
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03     PRETOR 06534 03 OF 03 012224Z

BE REDUCED IN NUMBER OR WITHDRAWN ONLY AS CIRCUMSTANCES  
(I.E., THE COURSE OF THE MPLA'S STRUGGLE WITH UNITA,  
AND TO A LESSER EXTENT FNLA AND FLEC, AND THE PRESENCE  
OF A LARGE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCE IN NORTHERN  
NAMIBIA) PERMIT.  
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**Errors:** N/A  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
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**Review Release Event:** n/a  
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**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009